JacquesChIRAQ wrote:

the germans were 80 millions(with austria the twin),france 40 millions only. So, there was nothing to do.

Now, let's add in the populations of the Netherlands, Belgium and Great Britain, all of which had forces on that front as well. The Allied forces and the Germans were virtually equal on 10 May 1940. The Allies had a slight advantage in number and in quality of armor, the Germans had a slight edge in the air.

The difference is that the Germans were much better commanded and organized. There is no way, given competent Allied leadership, that the Germans could have won a total victory using any strategy. Given good Allied leadership, the Manstein Plan should have resulted in the total cutoff and destruction of the best German armored forces.

The German General Staff fully expected to get their asses kicked if they tried an attack. The Manstein Plan was adopted because it was the only plan that gave Germany a chance--provided that Gamelin was an idiot. And he was.

They send 10 divisions, and instead rely on their ally, letting him supporting 90% of the war burden, as Churchill sadly noticed.

BTW, how does it feel to see that even Belgium, a neutral country, disposed of an army 2.5 more important than your

Gamelin told the British he didn't need any more soldiers. He was so sure he was going to win, he even let Poland get wiped out while he faced nothing but a dozen second-rate German divisions.

If he had thought for a second that maybe, just maybe, the Germans would try something different than they did in 1914, he might have won in spite of his arrogance.

They were last seen fighting and dying in a vain attempt to cover the escape of Martin Bormann

The survivors were either shot by General Leclerc in a fit of rage, or enlisted in the Foreign Legion, where they died under incompetent Frog leadership at Dien Bien Phu. The Froggies got their revenge on these Waffen-SS men, if they felt like they needed it.

I will try to sum up my point on this relentlessly coming tume about the French surrendering in 1940.

It started to dawn on me during the late seventies while I visited Roman monuments in the Roussilon and the Cathar castles in the Corbières in Southern France.

In each vilage we toured there was a WWI monument, after seeing a few I was intrigued to notice a pattern: there were often more names engraved on the stones than homes in the village.
I started to think about the family having lost one or two men to that war, the lonely women, the younger mot marrying having to leave their home place, the older raising children alone ....
No wonder this turned into an anti-war generation, calling WWI 'la der des der' the last of the last.
The man returning from the front having understood that his german counterpart was no different from him, didn't want to go for it again.

The difference between France and Germany was that the German had been humiliated and deprived from a lot of their land therefore had 'some' reason for willing a replay.

When the war started nobody was that happy, but the German got the high morale edge with that certainty to be in their right, plus their successes in Poland and Norway.

On may 1940, the French and British headquarters were clearly outsmarted, and after Rommel's seventh panzer crossed the Somme at the weakest point of the Allied front at Montmedy, there was quasi collapse of the Allied Armies - no ordnance reaching the troops, officers freed their men: 'chacun pour soi'.
A good many fought for their ground but there was no more coordinated command.

I am not going to rewrite history here, but it is obvious that much of it could be explained by an unwillingness to fight a war that had little meaning for the French people as compared to joyful German who believed in their rights to reclaim lost parts of their nation.

The will to fight grew afterward among the French as they took measure of the defeat and the growing suffering of the nation under German rule.

It is to be added that most of the pictures of the desolate French people running away as well as the fleeing French troopers were taken after the meltdown of the Army when there was nothing left but a terrible mess.
The German propaganda made its delight of them and gave them a fame they still have now.

About the German army and propaganda there's something to notice: the Wehrmacht was never as strong as it loved to let think.
Behind the motorized division there was infantry progressing with horses and wagoons, this was still true in Russia and in Normandy in 1944.

The much lauded panzers and elite divisions had a lot of good equipment while the rest of the Heeres, had its shortcomings.

The strength of the German attack on may 1940 was in its famed Schwehrpunkt, or concentration of forces on one point.

By the way this should have been the French strategy echoing Bonaparte teachings but French generals of 1940 weren't as they used to be.

Extensive information about forces in 1940 here:
www.militaryphotos.net . . .